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Relative Income, Network Interactions and Social Stigma † 
 
    Xi Chen            Xiaobo Zhang 
                                              Cornell University          IFPRI 
 
ABSTRACT 
Blood donation with compensation is considered as a social stigma. However, more people in the 
reference group donate blood often leads to less moral concern and more followers. Therefore, 
the behavior is likely to be influenced through one’s interactions with neighbors, friends and 
relatives. Meanwhile, relative income may affect the motives for blood donation through 
increasing mistrust and stress. The motives might be stronger for households of lower social 
rankings. Utilizing three-wave census-type panel data in 18 villages in rural western China, two 
identification strategies, instrumental variable and network-based identification, are implemented 
to estimate the effect of social interactions. Both community-specific and household-specific 
relative income measures are employed to test whether blood donation is more sensitive towards 
the less well-off in a society. We find strong evidence in support of the effects of social 
interactions, no matter whether instrumental variables or network centrality measures are 
adopted. Household-specific measures of relative income show more salient effects on blood 
donation than community-specific inequality. 
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“Everyone was rendered both victim and supporter of the system.” Václav Havel, 1978 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A longstanding assumption in neoclassic economics is that an agent’s utility depends solely 
on the absolute well-being,
1 and the recent literature on relativity has mainly referred keeping up 
with the Joneses to rich people in developed countries.
2 The empirical studies on the poor, 
particularly in developing countries, are more scant. However, recent evidence from developing 
countries has shown that relative concern over the others’ consumption matters.
3
Though considered a vehicle facilitating social networks and an attempt to gain higher 
social status in the environment without formal insurance, too many resources allocated to 
positional goods might contribute to an overall welfare loss. The fact that “positional 
externalities” compel villagers to spend lavishly in festivals, funerals, gift giving, house building 
and weddings to avoid been isolated from local social networks is thus a problem that is 
particularly acute for households living close to subsistence. 
 This reality has 
focused attention on positional goods, though relative concern is reflected in more dimensions 
than positional spending. 
Meanwhile, highly unequal income distribution in a society may lead to instability in social 
capital
4
                                                 
1 However, Smith implicitly put forward the idea in The Wealth of Nations in 1776, where he claimed that people 
should be endowed with the ability to appear in public without shame. Since Veblen’s seminal work in 1899, a few 
people started to believe that utility or happiness depends in part on the comparison of one’s own consumption to 
that of others, which was first formally modeled by Duesenberry (1949) in his relative income hypothesis. Since the 
1970’s, compelling evidence on relative concern has been accumulated (Easterlin, 1974; Sen, 1983; Frank, 1985; 
Van de Stadt et al., 1985). 
 through rising mistrust and stress or declining social cohesion, which expose households 
2 For example, Frank (1997) notes that in the US counties with high income inequality, intense competition for 
social status leads to higher median housing prices, higher personal bankruptcy rates, and a higher incidence of 
divorce. Bowles and Park (2002) find that total working hours were positively associated with higher inequality in 
OECD countries over time. Other evidence includes Clark and Oswald (1996), Solnick and Hemenway (1998), 
Neumark and Postlewaite (1998), Stutzer (2004), Luttmer (2005). Frank and Levine (2008) further find that relative 
concern could well explain the link between inequality and observed disparities in international savings rates, which 
were not predicted by traditional consumption theories. Frank and Levine (2008) define “Expenditure Cascade” in 
an economy where every agent except the richest one judges own behavior according to others closest above them. 
3 Evidence from designer-label goods consumption in Bolivia (Kempen, 2003), festivals’ budget in India (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2007), “splendid” funerals in Ghana (Economist, 2007), relative deprivation and migration in Mexico 
(Stark et al., 1991), bride-prices and dowries in south Asia and Africa (Rao, 1993; Dekker and Hoogeveen 2002), 
marriage payments in Bangladesh (Anderson, 2007), and community level consumption in Nepal (Fafchamps and 
Shilpi, 2008) show strong support for relative concern. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) further notice that isolation 
from market is associated with a significant increase in relative concern. 
4 Kawachi and Kennedy (1999) summarize plausible mechanisms linking income inequality and outcomes, which 
include erosion of social capital and stressful social comparisons.   - 4 - 
at the risk of self-financing when faced with shocks. Relative income may be of great importance 
in determining an individual’s access to local resources that are scarce within a backward 
community. These possible concerns might drive people to climb social ladders through 
exchanging blood for cash. Community specific inequality measures may restrict our attention to 
the impact of inequality that everyone is equally faced with. Household-specific relative income 
measures, to the contrary, have two immediate advantages over community-specific inequality 
measures: one, it allows us to move from community to household level data, avoiding the 
ecological fallacy; two, a specific pathway implicated in the relationship between income 
inequality and blood donation can be empirically evaluated. 
Poorer households are usually forced to distract higher shares of income from limited 
resources, which renders a stronger feeling of being surpassed on the social ladder. Empirical 
evidence has shown a negative relationship between relative deprivation and health-
compromising behavior (Deaton, 2001; Li and Zhu, 2006; Ling, 2009; Chen and Zhang, 2009a). 
Among them, Chen and Zhang (2009) provide preliminary evidence on the link between relative 
deprivation and blood donation. However, the effects of relative income are questionable since 
social interactions in the same econometric specification are not well identified. In this paper, 
more reasonable instrumental variables will be implemented to identify the real effect of social 
interactions on blood donation decisions. Luckily, our dataset also have detailed information on 
gift-exchange network for some villages, which facilitates improved identifications even 
compared with the instrumental variable strategy.   
Though special in several ways
5
                                                 
5 Kanbur (2004) argues that the blood donation market is special in three ways: one, concerns over abject poverty 
and extreme inequality in this market make the public feel uncomfortable or even outrageous, which is absent in a 
regular good market; two, those who act in the market might not be the weak agents who bear the consequences of 
actions; three, possible extreme outcomes accounts for another concern. Repeated blood donation might undermine 
donors’ long-term wellbeing and lead to persistent poverty because of its lasting harmful effects. For example, the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is proved exacerbated following blood plasma donation in insanitary conditions, such as Henan 
province in China. Among women of reproductive age, blood donation might undermine cognitive performance and 
work productivity of mothers and children. 
, does blood donation include regular elements of labor 
supply? If so, empirical specification should take into consideration those major factors in the 
labor market. Opportunities for households to increase farm income are limited in remote rural 
China, while the inequality of non-farm earnings is particularly severe. The equal blood 
compensation each time for the poor and the rich but diverging labor wage renders the poor more 
incentive to donate blood. However, if in the long term health cost is higher for the poor because   - 5 - 
of their severer vulnerability to illness, it is likely that the rich donate more blood. Besides, travel 
distance and costs should also be counted. 
This paper aims to address two issues. First, blood donation is often considered as a social 
stigma, more people donate blood generally leads to less moral concern and more followers. 
Therefore, the behavior might be influenced through social interactions with neighbors, friends 
and relatives. Two identification strategies, instrumental variable and network-based 
identification, will be implemented; second, relative income may affect the motives for blood 
donation through mistrust and stress. The motives might be sensitive to the distribution. Relative 
income measures, including community-specific inequality and household-specific relative 
deprivation, will be tested. 
To our knowledge, this is among the first studies to addressing the economic and social 
meaning of blood donation to the poor. While blood donation behavior has been documented in 
sociological, philosophical, ethical, anthropological literatures and popular novels, we have not 
seen any paper in economics focusing on this behavior. Meanwhile, while all the relevant 
literature explores individual cases, this paper is primarily based on a household level census 
panel data as well as long-term gift-exchange network data. Extensive information on blood 
donation and social interactions among other things enable us to identify the effect of social 
interactions and relative income properly.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the recent surge in social 
interactions, relative concern and blood donation in rural China is documented; section 3 
describes the three-wave census type survey and gift-exchange network data; section 4 derives 
illustrative models for blood donation. The identification of social interactions and measures of 
relative income are laid out. Based on that, our empirical strategies are provided and major data 
issues are discussed; section 5 reports estimation results; finally, section 6 concludes with future 
directions. 
 
2. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS, RELATIVE CONCERN AND BLOOD DONATION IN 
RURAL CHINA 
Economic reform in China began with the agricultural reform in the late 1970s after the 
release of production incentives which greatly benefited farmers. Since then, farmers have been 
faced with increasing price fluctuations in the input and output market as a result of   - 6 - 
decollectivization. More market fluctuation and less arable land per capita due to increasing 
population make agricultural production risky and unprofitable. Ironically, it might be the 
economic liberalization, which once droved the reform process, that deprives the poor of power 
to retain their blood, leaving them profound frustration over its absence.
6
In recent decades, economic and structural transformation in China has been followed by 
escalation in conspicuous consumptive investment, particularly housing, but no increases in 
productive investment that would secure durable increases in welfare (Brauw and Rozelle, 2008). 
Relative share of rural residents’ incomes allocated to gift-giving, dowry, bride price, and 
funerals, are considered vehicles for social prestige that might challenge social status (Yan, 1996; 
Liu, 2000). Such spending also facilitates social networks, which may be relied upon for mutual 
assistance, personal financing, or other forms of help. However, welfare consequences of 
“positional externalities” associated with status seeking are severe for Chinese households living 
close to subsistence. The highly ritualized practices of gift-giving compel villagers to offer gifts 
in order to avoid isolation from local networks. Generally, farm income is limited and nonfarm 
income is unequal and favors the rich. The isolated geography further deprives equal 
opportunities to migrate out, and dense population aggravates status seeking activities. Brown et 
al. (2008) recorded oral evidence during field work that inflows of remittances to some 
households set in motion status contests with adverse consequences for the others through long-
term blood donation. 
 However, are 
agricultural factors the only possible reasons behind the lasting blood donation? In other words, 
do social factors matter, such as social interaction in the network and relative concern over 
economic and social status? 
In China, blood is mainly supplied by voluntary donations. However, in Guizhou, Henan, 
and some other remote rural areas, blood banks provide cash compensation to blood donors.
7
                                                 
6 In August 2004, the State Administration of Taxation issued a new stipulation that the purchase of human blood is 
not subject to tax-free agricultural produce and should not be calculated at 13 % of the purchase price for the 
deduction of purchases VAT as applied to agricultural produce. Shao (2006) asks what makes human blood an 
“agricultural product” in the first place. 
 
Once the plasma is removed, the blood is re-infused. It is prohibited to donate blood more than 
once every two weeks (Asia Catalyst, 2007). Recently, Guizhou province has been a new supplier 
of blood plasma for the heel of the Henan Province in China (Yin, 2006). In 2006, there were 25 
blood plasma stations in Guizhou, which supplied 40% of total blood plasma in China, rendering 
7 In rural Guizhou, donors get 80 RMB nutrition subsidy in cash for the plasma contained in 500 cc of blood.   - 7 - 
it the largest market. Blood banks in Guizhou regulate that people more than 50 years old, less 
than 50kgs (male), less than 45kgs (female), or seriously disabled are not eligible to donate blood 
plasma. However, the regulation that is generally the most effective is through preventing 
seriously disabled blood donor.
8
In Puding county in Guizhou, the blood bank was shut down in 2006 due to Hepatitis C 
contamination and predatory behavior of over extracting blood plasma. Some residents continued 
to rely on donating blood, often traveling out to make donations. Since 2007, local blood banks 
send 100RMB cash prizes to registered donors at the end of each year in order to meet the fast 
increasing market demand for blood plasma. Meanwhile, donors are required to donate once 
every 15 days at a fixed volume of 580cc. Cash penalty is applied for each day that registered 
blood donors delay their donation. Due to the current incentive scheme, there is almost no 
difference in blood donation frequency between busy season and slack season. Blood donors 
usually travel once every 15 days to the blood bank to donate.  
 
From our dataset, it is also observed that the majority of blood donors in a family are 
women, which might reflect labor division to accommodate agricultural production or off-farm 
work, as the opportunity cost for men engaging in these two activities are higher than women. 
Meanwhile, once a family starts to donate blood, in very few cases it quits. Therefore, there is 
much smaller variation over time in blood donation than cross-sectional variation. 
 
3. DATA 
The dataset for this study comes from three waves of census-type rural household survey 
conducted by ourselves in three administrative villages (including 18 natural villages) in Puding 
County, Western China.
9 Located in the central part of the poorest Guizhou province, Puding is a 
median level county in Guizhou. It is geographically isolated and multi-ethnic.
10
Initially, reference groups are defined according to natural villages, which are evolved 
naturally without political command but through generations of residence. In Guizhou, 
 Guizhou now 
provides the largest market share of blood plasma in China. 
                                                 
8 Regulations through other channels are not efficient because people in Guizhou are normally shorter and lighter 
than people in many other provinces. Faced with the huge demand for blood, it is not easy to enforce the age and 
weight regulations. For more information, refer to China HIV/AIDS Information Network http://www.chain.net.cn/. 
9 This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou University. 
10 More than 20 ethnic groups are living in Puding county, including Han, Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and yi. In total, ethnic 
minorities comprise about 20% of population.   - 8 - 
geographic segregations formed by the unique Karst landform further isolate social interactions. 
Reference groups have 42 households on average, which form a close link connecting each other. 
Usually, the majority of residents retain certain kinds of kinship within a natural village. 
Moreover, we combine natural villages together for some ethnic minority villages because of 
their strong internal ties.
11
For the first wave, all 801 households were surveyed at the beginning of 2005. The survey 
collects detailed information on household demographics, income, consumption, transfers, 
expenditures and incomes related to gift-giving, weddings, funerals, and blood donation. Most 
information is collected for each household member, including members that were working 
outside the county at the time of survey. Though sensitive, information on blood donation is 
accurate and reliable since it accounts for large share of household income, and our local student 
surveyors and residents show mutual trust. 
 
A follow-up survey of the same households was administered in early 2007 and 833 
households was interviewed. However, the local blood bank was shut down in 2006 due to 
Hepatitis C contamination and predatory behavior of over extracting blood plasma. Thus, much 
fewer local residents were able to continue except that some people travelled out to donate. The 
local blood bank has recovered since 2008. 
In January 2010, the third wave follow-up survey was conducted for the 18 natural villages 
and 872 households were interviewed. Further information on each of the family members 
donating blood was collected. Meanwhile, a ten-year gift-exchange data for each household in 
three natural villages are collected. Gift-exchange data were recorded during major social 
occasions, including male members’ wedding, female members’ wedding, funeral, coming-of-
age ceremony, child birth ceremony, and house-moving ceremony. Gift-receiving records are 
usually kept for a long time in order to pay back accordingly when celebrations in other families 
are held.
12
                                                 
11 Recent migration exerts little influence on reference groups. First, more often only some members migrate, and 
they often do not come back in several years. Second, even migrants themselves are not likely to change reference 
groups because of the Hukou system and other discriminating policies. In urban China, rural migrants usually join 
migrants’ social networks, differing from urban networks. 
 Household social links between the three villages and the other fifteen surveyed 
villages nearby were also captured. The data collection alleviated missing relations linking 
outside and avoided implicitly ranking relationships, mixing real and potential Links, and 
12 If all family members are illiterates, a group of two or three educated relatives usually help record and check gift-
giving on the celebration days.   - 9 - 
ambiguously treating receiving and giving out resources. We identified around 353 households 
in total, which make 3150 links connecting gift senders and gift receivers. The information on 
social connections will be used to identify heterogeneous social influence imposed by 
households. 
 
4. ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In the first subsection an illustrative model for blood donation under social norm is set up. 
In the next two subsections, identification of social interactions and relative income are laid out 
respectively. Finally, econometric specifications incorporating the identification of the two 
effects are shown in the fourth subsection, in which major data issues are discussed. 
4.1 Social Norms, Relative Wage, and Blood Donation 
In this subsection, we develop a model of blood donation in a social norm. Blood donation 
should be subject to rules for labor supply. Suppose there is a continuum of households in an 
economy. Each household decides how long to work in the labor market ( i l ) and how long to 
spend on blood donation ( i b ). Normalizing working hours, we assume all households spend one 
time unit in the labor market and  max ( / , [0, ), ) ii iii i hh b lh H h H = ∈= time unit on blood donation, and 
they are heterogeneous in labor efficiency ( i θ ). i θ  is distributed between  min θ  and  max θ  under the 
cumulative distribution function  () F θ . Let us consider a household decision model (Hideaki, 
2009) with exogenous wage rate: 
max ( ( , , , ), ( , ))
i
ii i h Uch w Shh θϕ     
. . (1 ) ii st c h w ϕθ    ≤ +  
Where U( ) ⋅  is the utility function, c denotes consumption,  0, 0 c cc UU >  <.  () S ⋅  is the social 
stigma function which represents disutility from blood donation,  0 S U < ,  0 SS U < . As the 
standard setup,  0 cS Sc UU = < , which means 1) the greater the disutility is from blood donation, 
the lower is the marginal utility of consumption; 2) the marginal disutility from blood donation 
becomes greater as consumption increase. In other words, the wealthier people suffer more from 
an increasing social stigma than their lower income counterparts. h  is the average level of blood 
donation in the reference group. Blood donation is assumed to be ϕ  times as efficient as regular 
labor supply. w is the wage rate for a unit of labor in efficiency terms. A person with labor   - 10 - 




Therefore,   represents relative price of blood donation to labor supply ( / ii ww ϕ ϕθ θ = ). The 
social stigma function  () S ⋅  satisfies  0 h S > ,  0 hh S > ,  0 h S < ,  0 hh S < . We further assume that a 
person does not feel guilty if one does not donate blood regardless of the average level of blood 
donation in the reference group, which means  (0, ) 0 Sh = . The first order condition for an 
interior solution is: 
( (,,,) ,(,) ) ( (,,,) ,(,) ) (,)
0
ii i ii i i
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Which solves optimal level of blood donation 
*(,,,) i h hw θϕ  given the labor efficiency ( i θ ), the 
average level of blood donation in the reference group (h ), and the wage level (w). The second 
order condition is satisfied. To derive the impact of the social norm on blood donation, we 
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    It means that an increase in blood donation in the neighborhood induces i to donate more 
blood. Differentiating LHS of (1) with respect to w yields 
[ () ] [ () ] 0
i ii i i
i c i cc h w cS h S hh h Sc h w SS h
h hh h h
U w U c cU S U S S U c cU S
w ww w w
ϕθ ϕθ
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
+ ++ + + ++ =
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
 
Collecting the term  / i hw ∂∂ , we get 
2
[ (1 ) (1 )] [ (1 )]
()
i ci c ci h S ci i c c c h S ci i
i cc h i cS h S hh h Sc h h SS
h U w U h SU h U U c SU h
w wU c wU S U S S U c S U SOC
ϕ ϕ θ ϕ ϕθ ϕ ϕ ϕθ
ϕθ ϕθ
∂ + + ++ + ++
=−=−
∂ + ++ +
 
              ( ) ( ) [ (1 ) (1 )]
ii
c c ci ih S ci
i
hh
sign sign sign U U h w S U h
w
ϕ ϕ ϕθ ϕ
θ
∂∂
= = ++ + +
∂∂
         (2) 
                                                 
13 All the households in our census-type survey are faced with only one blood market that sets up a unique blood 
compensation price, while human resources vary a lot among people and areas. It implies an equalized “fluid labor” 
wage and unequal labor wages.   - 11 - 
which means that the impact of wage rate (w) increase on blood donation is undetermined. First, 
rising wage rate increases blood donation through higher utility from consumption; second, 
rising income and consumption induce a fall in marginal utility of consumption; third, a rise in 
consumption makes marginal disutility of the social stigma greater. Thus, only if the second and 
the third negative effects can offset the first positive effect, we are able to conclude that blood 
donation drop with rising wage rate. 
Comparing (2) and (3), we have larger absolute values of the second term and the third term 
in (2). When  /0 i hw ∂ ∂< and  /0 i h ϕ ∂ ∂> simultaneously hold, people with higher relative labor 
efficiency (wage) or higher wage rate are less likely to supply blood. This still requires a large 
decreasing marginal utility of consumption ( cc U ) and a large increasing marginal disutility of the 
social stigma ( Sc U ). The large marginal disutility of the social stigma is usually associated with 
wealthier people since they suffer more from an increasing social stigma than their lower income 
counterparts. However, the rich are less sensitive to relative labor efficiency improvement. 
                              
[ ( ) ( )] i c cc i i h Sc i i h U U h w SU h w
SOC





      
( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ]
i
c cc i i h Sc i c cc i i h Sc i
h
sign sign U U h w S U h sign U U h w S U h ϕ ϕ ϕθ ϕ ϕ θ
ϕ
∂
=+ + = ++
∂
      (3)  
Meanwhile, if ϕ  is small, i.e. relative price of blood donation to labor supply is small, then 
it is more likely that  /0 i h ϕ ∂ ∂>, and blood donation will become a less attractive income 
generating alternative. 
Considering the corner solutions for h, if an individual spends time H  donating blood 
(hH → ), according to Kuhn-Tucker condition we have 














where the labor efficiency is low enough that the marginal utility of consumption by increasing 
blood donation dominates the marginal disutility originated from the social stigma for the whole 
range of h. Let θ  denote the lower threshold level of labor efficiency below which the 
individual spends the largest amount of time donating blood. The above equality holds with θ .  
In contrast, if the labor efficiency is high enough that the marginal utility of consumption is 
dominated by the marginal disutility from the social stigma for the whole range ofh, the   - 12 - 
following inequality holds. Let θ  denote the higher threshold level of labor efficiency above 
which the individual spends no time donating blood. The following equality holds with θ . 
        














Finally, to achieve interior market equilibrium of the social norm, an ex ante expectation of the 
average level of blood donation (participation rate and level) should coincide with the resulting 
average blood donation given that expectation. 
max
min
(,, ,) () h h h w dF
θ
θ θ ϕθ =∫  
where  min max θ θθθ <<< . Meanwhile, a stable equilibrium of the social norm requires that 
/ 1 ,, ii h h hw θ ∂ ∂< ∀ . 
 
4.2 Identification of Social Interactions on Blood Donation 
This paper focuses on identifying how social interactions affect blood donation. Generally 
speaking, a problem in specifying a model of social influence on behavior has to do with proper 
identification of the specified relationships, meaning that the parameters of the model are 
uniquely determined by a dataset. The identification problem in social influence arises since 
behavior is determined by behavior, which brings a circularity of cause and effect (Manski, 1993; 
Manski, 2000). 
In our estimation of social influences, household blood donation is a linear function of the 
average blood donation among other households in the cohort. Suppose that a household i has 
relevant characteristics i x , and other households in the cohort have similar attributes. The blood 
donation behavior of household i is determined by what the peers do. The econometric 
specification is the following, 
12 [|] i ii i i y a bE y x bx ε = + ++ 






ii ii i ii i
b a
Ey x a b Ey x bx Ey x x
bb
= + +⇒ = +
−−
 
Plugging into the econometric specification, we can estimate  1 /(1 ) ab −  and  21 /(1 ) bb − , but 
we cannot separately identify parameters a,  1 b  and  2 b . Adding in more variables does not help,   - 13 - 
since more variables bring more parameters to identify. As Manski (1993, 2000) points out, 
instrumental variables might be able to resolve the problem, since part of the difficulty arises 










The reflection problem stems from the fact that household i’s peers are not identified 
directly but assumed to be similar to i. However, unique to social network studies, information 
on social structure can help identify those parameters. Specifically, if we explicitly track i’s peers, 
then that information can be used to identify a model (Anselin, Florax and Rey, 2004). Jackson 
(2008) formulates the following linear interaction of behaviors and ignores constant terms and 
node-specific characteristics. 
i ij j i
j
y gy ασ ε = + ∑  
where each individual’s behavior is a weighted average of peers’ behavior.  ij g  is a entry in the 
adjacency matrix G denoting whether there is a link between household i and j. If () IG ασ −  is 
invertible, then 
1 () YI G ασ ε
− = −  
where y and ε  are the corresponding vectors. We can identify ασ  if we have knowledge of the 
adjacency matrix and the covariance matrix of the error term []
T E εε . Here the critical 
precondition for identification is that the adjacency matrix is asymmetric, i.e. a link from i to j 
does not necessarily mean a link from j to i.  
A summary of centrality concepts is provided in Appendix II. In the empirical tests, 
Bonacich (1987) centrality is used to compare the results with IV estimations. The Bonacich 
centrality vector is defined as 
1 [] C I GJ ασ
− = −  
where I  is a NxN identity matrix, and J  is a Nx1 column vector of ones. An adjacent NxN 
matrix of 1 and 0 denotes direct connections between each pair of agents. Meanwhile, the matrix 
is asymmetric that a link from i to j has different meaning than the link from j to i. The terms in 
the diagonal are all assumed to be zero.   - 14 - 
The classical centrality index includes information on connections but not intensity of those 
connections. However, intensity weighted centrality can be calculated based on a modification of 
the algorithm. In the results, two centrality measures and their impacts on blood donation 
behavior are compared. Since we only have extensive social network data for three out of 
eighteen villages surveyed, our samples have to be narrowed down when we further identify the 
impact of social interactions on blood donation. 
 
4.3 Relative Income Measures 
Besides social interactions, we pay special attention to identifying the impact of relative 
incomes on blood donation. Previous studies use different measures of relative income. For 
instance, Gerdtham and Johannesson (2004) use mean and median income of a reference group 
as a proxy for relative income. Li and Zhu (2006) apply rank and an interactive term between 
rank and Gini coefficient to capture relative income. Eibner and Evans (2005) apply a measure of 
relative deprivation. 
Relative deprivation was originally proposed by Runciman (1966), who argues that one is 
deprived if the others in the group possess something that one does not have. Easterlin (1974) 
proposed a simple model to incorporate consumption norms into the individual’s utility 
maximization framework whereby utility of individual i depends on i’s consumption relative to a 
weighted average of other people’s consumption. Yitzhaki (1979) develops the definition by 
viewing income as personal possessions and deriving the relationship between relative 
deprivation and income inequality. Chakravarty (1990) defined relative deprivation as “utility 
foregone” because of not possessing the economic variables under consideration. Similar to 
Easterlin (1974), Cooper et al. (2001) propose a model whereby individual’s utility depends on 
the absolute quantity and the quality of a good consumed as well as on the quantity and quality 
of status good consumed relative to reference or peer group members. Wildman (2003a, 2003b) 
shows the relationship among average health, health inequalities, absolute level of income, and 
income inequalities, and links absolute and relative income hypotheses in the production of 
health. 
In Yitzhaki (1979) and Wildman (2003a), the level of deprivation experienced by an 
individual i with income y relative to another individual with income z is formulated as, 
(; ) Diy z y = −   if  yz <   or   - 15 - 
                                                     (; ) 0 Diy =          if  yz ≥  
Based on this form, one would feel more deprived as the number of individuals in society 
with higher income z increases. Thus, an overall measure of deprivation for the individual i is 
given by summing the differences in income and weighting it with the proportion of people with 
higher income than the individual i. Accordingly, Li and Zhu (2006) define relative deprivation 






= − ∑    ji yy ∀> 
Through normalization by  i N , the total number of people in their reference groups, RDA 
adopts normalized total income of other group members who earn more than i does to measure 
the relative deprivation of person i with income  i y . One concern with RDA is that it does not 
take into account differences in the scale of the income distribution across reference groups. In 
other words, if everyone’s income doubles, relative deprivation will double as well. This would 
be a problem as we are using a panel dataset to measure relative deprivation over time, and 
incomes are not adjusted for inflation. Even if people view within-reference group income 
differences in proportional terms, RDA still overstates relative deprivation of individuals in high-
income reference groups. To improve upon it, RDI is defined as the ratio of RDA relative to 
person i’s own income. 
/ i ii RDI RDA y =  
Intuitively following the measure of Gini coefficient, Wildman (2003b) proposes a measure 
of relative deprivation for an individual with income y at the provincial level and stratifies it by 
urban and rural regions as follows: 
1 ( ) [1 ( )] [1 ( )] y d F Fy y Fy µ =− −−  
where µ  denotes mean income and the population is ranked by income.  1() Fy is the cumulative 
proportion of total income up to the income y and  () Fy is the cumulative proportion of the 
population up to the individual with income y. 
Deaton (2001) proposes a measure of relative deprivation for an individual i with income x 
at the provincial level and stratifies it by urban and rural regions: 
(1/ ) ( ) ( )
T x
x
y x dF y µ − ∫    or   (1/ )[1 ( )][ ( ) ] Fx x x µµ
+ −−    - 16 - 
where µ  denotes mean income for those in the reference group, 
T x  is the highest income in the 
group. F(y) is the cumulative distribution of incomes among individuals in the group, and  () x µ
+  
is the average income of those with income higher than the individual with income x. In sum, the 
measure is the normalized difference between the average income of those with higher income 
and income x weighted by the proportion of those with income higher than the individual i. 
Deaton (2001) index is similar to RDI but divided by mean reference group income instead of  i y . 
RDI is sometimes preferred to Deaton index as it is less sensitive to the income distribution. 
All relative income measures above presume that the distance between two agents matters, 
either in proportional or absolute terms. However, studies on animals suggest rank over distance 
in importance. To test whether it takes effect on human beings, individual’s rank over incomes 
within the reference group are used (Eibner and Evans, 2005; Li and Zhu, 2006). Unlike most of 
the other measures, rank is unaffected by changes in the shape of the income distribution. Thus, 
unlike the other measures, rank does not reflect differences in income inequality across groups. 
In other words, Rank ignores the magnitude of income differences among individuals and 
incorporates less information on relative deprivation. 
In a densely populated and isolated rural society, residents usually compare themselves with 
others within the village. Thus, we are able to define reference groups and construct relative 
deprivation indexes accordingly. 
 
4.4 Empirical Strategy 
This paper focuses on estimating the effect of relative income and social interactions on 
household blood donation. Most of the empirical studies on social interaction and relative 
concern rely on sampling in a cross-sectional context, which impedes them from capturing a full 
dynamic picture of relative status within groups. Our study alleviates these problems by utilizing 
a three-wave census type panel data set, in which all households from 18 villages were surveyed 
in 2004, 2006 and 2009.  
Meanwhile, strategies are implemented to deal with simultaneity, as a household’s blood 
donation behavior might indirectly affect the overall blood donation in the reference group. For   - 17 - 
instance, previous blood donation in the reference group is used to estimate their impacts on the 
household blood donation in the following period.
14
Further, two strategies are applied to identify reference groups. First, identification based on 
natural villages is adopted, which might be less problematic in our context due to the remote 
mountainous location that isolates social interactions. Instrumental Variable estimation is then 
applied to deal with unobserved factors that blur our estimations. The validity of this treatment is 
based on the assumption that the researcher a priori knows the group with whom a person may 
interact (Manski, 2000). However, local residents might influence each other across natural 
villages, and the mutual influences for each pair of households are expected to be heterogeneous. 
Therefore, more information on social interactions is needed to identify the effect of social 
preference. We improve upon the first identification strategy through collecting long-term 
network data on gift exchanges. The value of gifts displays existence and intensity of social 
connection, while gifts across villages are also captured to obtain the complete picture of social 
interactions. 
 
We first estimate two logit models for household blood donation participation decisions: 
,, , 1 ,, ,, , , ,, , , ,,
,, , 1 ,, ,, ,, , , ,,
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( 1) ( , , , , , , ) (5)
irt rt irt irt rt rt irt rt rt irt
irt rt irt irt irt rt rt irt
P BD MBD Inc Incsq Inequ Inequ Rank Rwage Travel





where  ,, irt BD  denotes whether or not a household i in village r donates blood at time t.  , rt Rwage  
denotes the ratio of local wage to blood donation compensation for each village r at time t. 
, rt Travel  denotes travel time from each village to the local blood bank, which captures non-
money blood donation cost.
15
,, irt Χ   is composed of a set of household and village control 
variables, including household head’s gender, age, education, ethnicity, cadre and party 
membership, share of the elderly in the households, year and village fixed effects. Shocks, such 
as family member death, serious diseases, natural disasters, and livestock death, are included. 
Blood donation compensation is excluded from measures of income, inequality, and relative 
deprivation. 
                                                 
14 We assume that individual behavior varies with the median feature of group behavior. It is close to the real world 
that people normally follow the general public around them. 
15 Blood donation behavior is usually concentrated where local transportation condition permits. Even in an 
administrative village, transportation condition varies a lot among natural villages. In natural villages with better 
road access, farmers use carts to transport people to the county seat and the nearby blood bank, while for ethnic 
minority groups living in the mountains, people are generally unable to regularly donate blood.   - 18 - 




 Some people may believe that frequent blood donation is the consequence of 
low income and poverty, so   is defined to test this hypothesis. The square term  ,, irt Incsq  is 
also included to capture potential concave relationship between per capita income and blood 
donation, since marginal increase in probability of blood donation might decrease with income to 
a certain level before going negative. 
Studies exploring the effects of aggregate income and income inequality on aggregate 
outcomes often find significant impact of income inequality. Household-level studies that control 
for household income, in contrast, may not show a relationship between income inequality and 
outcome at all. The convex relationship between income and outcome might erroneously appear 
as a causal relationship between inequality and outcome. Controlling for income and its square at 
the household level is vital to identifying the concave effect of income as well as impact of 
inequality.     
Inequality may lead to instability in social capital through rising mistrust and stress or 
declining social cohesion, which expose households at the risk of self-financing when faced with 
shocks. Meanwhile, relative income may be of great importance to determine an individual’s 
access to local resources that are scarce within a backward community. These possible concerns 
might drive people to climb social ladders through exchanging blood for cash.  
The first specification includes a community specific measure of income inequality  , rt Inequ , 
the Gini coefficient, to test whether severe inequality within a society leads to more blood 
donation participation, holding absolute income constant. The hypothesis suggests that inequality 
affects all members in a society equally, irrespective of their social rankings.  
A further hypothesis states that inequality has more harmful effects on blood donation 
towards people in a lower social hierarchy.
17
, ,, * rt irt Inequ Rank  In the first specification,   is 
adopted to test this hypothesis. A positive coefficient is expected if the hypothesis is proved. 
                                                 
16 If a person is turned away because he/she looks sick, this could simultaneously affect his/her income as the same 
appearance makes them look ill. Though it is believed that very few people were ever turned back from donating 
blood, it should be better to replace income with predicted wages from a mincerian type wage equation. 
17 The impact of inequality on blood donation may be further complicated due to the fact that a more unequal 
income distribution might reduce stress, distrust and the resulting blood donation among the middle class but 
aggravate it in the two tails of the distribution. Meanwhile, heterogeneity might take effect that some people are 
highly competitive and others are conformists, and people differ in their pride and compassion towards the poor 
around them.   - 19 - 
However, since rank does not include information on exact income disparity among households 
in a group other than an ordinal ranking, neither does it reflect income inequality across groups, 
major relative deprivation indexes  ,, irt RD  (e.g. Wildman, 2003b; Deaton, 2001) are utilized in 
the second specification to test the effect of inequality with cardinal feature. Overall, relative 
deprivation measures aid us in more accurately testing whether an individual’s income relative to 
others in the reference group, rather than relative position, matters to blood donation. 
In (4) and (5), we also explore the effect of social interactions on blood donation decision, 
besides the abovementioned effects of relative income measures. To improve the empirical 
identification of the effect, two strategies are implemented: one, median blood donation 
participation rate in the natural village
18
,1 rt MBD −    is instrumented by prior period average 
income and other parameters that may affect this choice, such as the distance of major clinics; 
two, network data based on long-term gift exchanges within and between villages are collected 
to identify the effect of social interactions, which directly addresses the identification problem.  
In other scenarios,  ,, irt BD  denotes values of blood donation (Appendix III-1) or share of 
family members donating blood. Correspondingly,  ,1 rt MBD −  denotes median values of blood 
donation (Appendix III-1) or mean number of family members donating blood. 
,, , ,, ,, , , ,, , , ,,
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In (6) and (7), the blood donation participation, values of donation or share of family 
members donating blood serve as dependent variables  ,, irt BD . Different measures of centrality 
, rt Cen  are based on a long-term gift-exchange network that incorporates the information on 
whether gift senders donate blood and/or how much they donate. It is believed that relatives, 
friends and neighbors of varying closeness should differ in their impacts against targeted 
households. Their different impacts can be characterized by whether any gift link exists for each 
pair of households and the values of gifts, since gift-exchange accounts for a large share of 
expenditure in the poor region and should be a good proxy for closeness.   
In Table 8 six measures of centrality are utilized to capture their effects on blood donation 
participation. Measure 1 is a normalized centrality measure weighted by whether a gift sender is 
                                                 
18 The household’s blood donation is excluded from calculating median level blood donation in the reference group.   - 20 - 
also a blood donor. Measure 2 differs from Measure 1 in that it treats gift-exchange in each year 
as a complete network. Measure 3 utilizes values of gifts to calculate centrality and weights them 
by whether a gift sender is also a blood donor. Measure 4 through Measure 6 respectively follow 
the same logic in calculating centrality but weight them by values of blood donation. In Table 9, 
the four centrality measures include Measure 2, Measure 1, Measure 5 and Measure 4. 
Table 10 presents the effect of social interactions and relative incomes on share of family 
members donating blood (i.e. blood donation intensity). The estimations follow (6) and (7), and 
the centrality measures follow Measure 2 and Measure 5 but weighted by the number of family 
members donating blood in the gift senders’ family. 
In the Appendix, tobit estimations for values of blood donation are laid out, which follow 
the same identification strategies and measures of centrality.
19
 
 Compared to number of family 
members donating blood, they both measure intensity of blood donation. The local blood 
donation regulation strongly discourages people from quitting, and they easily rely on this 
activity once participate in. The regulation also limits frequency of donation and compensation 
each time. Therefore, the major difference in the value of blood donation is reflected by the 
number of family members that donate blood. However, value of blood donation is not as 
accurate, which makes number of family members donating blood an excellent proxy. Total 
values of blood donation are generally estimated according to compensation each time, 
frequency of donation and number of family members donating blood. For one thing, part of the 
differences in values of blood donation comes from including/excluding travel costs and the 
resulting donation compensation. For another, each year some households start to donate while 
some quit, which is reflected in the values of blood donation. Therefore, estimations on values of 
blood donation complement estimations on share of family members donating blood.  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 7 provides us with empirical test of blood donation decision using full sample data 
from 2004, 2006 and 2009 survey. Binary choice model estimations explore factors influencing 
whether a household donate blood or not. Simple logit estimations are implemented from column 
I to IV, and column V and VI further instrument median blood donation participation rate in the 
                                                 
19 Since zero values are dominant, percentage change in donation value between 2004 and 2006 is not defined. Thus, 
we use level rather than log value as suggested by Wooldridge (2001).   - 21 - 
natural village by travel time to the local hospital and average income for the prior period in the 
natural village to estimate its impact on household blood donation participation. The results 
consistently show its significantly positive effect, i.e. the more households around donate blood, 
the more likely this household follows. Both inequality and relative income measures show more 
pressure towards households in the lower social hierarchy, which is consistent with column I to 
VI that the rank-Gini interactive term and major relative deprivation indexes are positively 
significant. The official stipulation prohibits the elderly from donating blood, which corresponds 
to their significantly lower probability of donation in our estimation. Both 2006 and 2009 have 
seen decreasing trend of blood donation compared to 2004, however, the trend is not significant 
in the IV estimations. Moreover, the trend is less salient for 2009 than 2006, which shows 
somewhat recovery of local blood market from the blood contamination incident in 2006. 
Table 8 and Table 9 utilize gift-based network data from a sub-sample of three villages to 
identify the effect of social interactions. In Table 8, social interactions in all columns, measured 
by blood donation and weighted by classical centrality, show significantly positive impact on a 
household’s blood donation. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the classical community-
specific Gini coefficient has no significant impact on blood donation. Even if Gini coefficient is 
interacted with rank to measure the heterogeneous pressure in the distribution, it is still 
insignificant. However, this does not mean that a more unequal society has no significant effect 
on blood donation. To the contrary, deeper economic stratification drives people at the bottom to 
exchange more blood for money. In all scenarios in Table 9, social interactions significantly 
induce households to engage in blood donation. Concerning relative income measures, both 
household-specific Deaton and Wildman relative deprivation indexes significantly predict blood 
donation, verifying the linkage between status concern and blood donation. One exception is the 
rank measure. It is predictably insignificant as it does not include any information on how far in 
terms of income a household is from the richer households, which is the core of relative 
deprivation measures. Accordingly, neither the interactive term between rank and Gini 
coefficient captures income shortfall and the resulting feeling of relative deprivation. 
As argued that compensation from blood donation may suffer from various errors, share of 
family members who donate blood serves to proxy the intensity of blood donations within a 
household. Table 10 compares results for full-sample estimation with sub-sample estimation. In 
the full sample estimation, mean number of blood donors for a household in a village is   - 22 - 
instrumented by travel time to the major clinics nearby. Centrality in the sub-sample estimations, 
measured by number of blood donors in a household and weighted by network connections, is 
used to identify the effect of social interaction. In all scenarios applying either of the two 
identification strategies, social interactions impose significantly positive impact on the share of 
family members donating blood. Once again, higher values of all measures of relative incomes 
significantly lead to higher share of family members donating blood. 
Minority status should not lead to lower blood donation upon controlling for major factors 
(such as travel time to the local blood bank) and well identify social norm. Most ethnic minority 
groups live in the mountains region due to their traditional culture and historical conflict with the 
Han group. The geographic condition, rather than their ethnic identities, prevents them from 
climbing down and donating blood. It is also found that residents in more developed regions are 
less likely to donate blood, which might be caused by more work opportunities available, though 
there also presents easy access to the local blood bank. 
Throughout all estimations the ratio of local wage in the busy season to blood donation 
compensation is insignificant, which is also true when wage in the busy season is replaced by 
wage in the slack season. It is consistent with the situation that blood donation compensation has 
been much larger than market wage for a long time period. Meanwhile, since 2007 the blood 
donation compensation has nearly doubled. As a result, rapid wage increase in the recent years 
does not offset blood donation. The much more attractive short term payoff from blood donation 
binds the local labor market. 
Shocks such as family member death
20
Before panel data model estimations, Hausman tests for fixed/random effect are conducted. 
Results consistently show that random effect suits the data better, since households’ blood 
donation variations over time are small, while cross-sectional variations are much higher. In 
, big disease, natural disaster, livestock death, and 
major stealing do not drive people into donating (more) blood, even if we combine all shocks 
together as one dummy variable. It suggests that blood donation compensation may have special 
usage, such as positional competition, extending informal social network, and cigarette and wine 
consumption. 
                                                 
20 It is true in some cases that family member death can be out of expectation, while in other cases, such as in the 
traditional Chinese culture with rooted tradition to save, family members die in old ages with large amount of 
precautionary savings paying for funeral fees and possible medical treatment. Meanwhile, people exchange gifts in 
social events such as weddings, funerals, college entry, and house building (Table 5). Therefore, sometimes we may 
observe that shock and social event occurrences are smoothed without significant impact on blood donation.   - 23 - 
other words, between effects are much larger than within effects. Therefore, random effect 
models are adopted. After random effect estimation, serial correlation test for the random effect 
model are conducted, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that no significant serial 
correlation exists. It is reasonable that the survey only spans for six years. 
In Appendix III, factors influencing value of blood donation are tested. Column I through 
IV apply simple tobit model, while column V and VI further instrument median blood donation 
participation rate in the natural village by travel time to the local hospital and average income for 
the prior period in the natural village to estimate its impact on household blood donation value. 
The median value of blood donation from the peers still significantly increases this household’s 
donation value, as more donation around means less ethical concern for blood donation itself. 
Table 11 verifies the effect of network-based social interactions on blood donation value. 
Meanwhile, neither Gini coefficient nor Deaton RD index saliently predicts donation value.       
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSIONS 
Recent evidence from developing countries has shown that relative concern over the others 
matters. For one thing, highly unequal income distribution in a society may lead to instability in 
social capital through rising mistrust and stress or declining social cohesion, which expose 
households at the risk of self-financing when faced with shocks. Relative income may be of great 
importance in determining an individual’s access to local resources that are scarce within a 
backward community; for another, though considered a vehicle facilitating social networks and 
an attempt to gain higher social status in the environment without formal insurance, too many 
resources allocated to positional goods might contribute to an overall welfare loss. The fact that 
“positional externalities” compel villagers to spend lavishly in festivals, funerals, gift giving, 
house building and weddings to avoid been isolated from local social networks is thus a problem 
that is particularly acute for households living close to subsistence. 
Is there a pathway through which social interactions and concerns for relative income affect 
blood donation decisions? Though considered a social stigma, more people in the reference 
group donate blood often leads to less moral concern and more followers. Therefore, the 
behavior is likely to be influenced through one’s interactions with neighbors, friends and 
relatives. Meanwhile, relative income may affect the motives for blood donation through   - 24 - 
increasing mistrust and stress. The motives might be stronger for households of lower social 
rankings. 
Utilizing three-wave census-type panel data in 18 villages in rural western China, two 
identification strategies, instrumental variable and network-based identification, are implemented 
to estimate the effect of social interactions. Both community-specific and household-specific 
relative income measures are employed to test whether blood donation is more sensitive towards 
the less well-off in a society. Because of close ties among friends, relatives and neighbors, 
isolation from outside market, mountainous geographic conditions among villages, and rapid 
economic and social transformation with worsening inequality, the region for our study serves as 
an excellent destination to observe relative concern and social behavior in readily identifiable 
reference groups. 
Empirical results show consistent evidence for the effects of social interactions, no matter 
whether instrumental variables or network centrality measures are adopted. Household-specific 
measures of relative income show more salient effects on blood donation than community-
specific inequality. The significance of household-specific measures warns us that if we do not 
incorporate the idea of these measures, redistribution policies might be deviated to the wrong 
route. 
Future directions might include: one, fellow residents and cadres may impose different 
influences on a household’s blood donation decision. In the literature, the former is social 
pressure, while the latter is social imitation. We might consider separately indentify the two 
social interactions; two, we will consider identifying direct effect of gift-giving over blood 
donation. To achieve that, big events such as birth, marriages and funerals could serve as 
instruments for give giving; finally, if people were ever turned back from donating blood 
because they look sick, this could simultaneously affect their incomes as the same appearance 
makes them look ill. To get around this potential concern, we consider replace income with 
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Per capita income (no blood donation)
Administrative Village 1-3
 
Source: Authors’ 2004 survey data 
Note: Two vertical lines, “L” and “H”, refer to the low (668RMB) and high (892RMB) poverty lines. 
 
 
Figure 2 Division of Labor in Blood Donation 
 
Source: Authors’ 2009 survey data 
Note: The three bars in each group correspond to “mainly husband (or male members) donates blood”, “mainly wife 
(or female members) donates blood”, and “husband (or male members) and wife (or female members) donate 
equally donate blood”. The pattern reflects different labor market situation in three villages. 
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Source: Authors’ survey data 
Note: The left figure and right figure respectively show their relationship using equation (7) without / with potential 
effects of shocks and social events. 
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Source: Authors’ survey data 
Note: The left figure includes households that do not donate blood.   31 
Table 1 Summary Statistics by Three Administrative Villages 
    Village 1  Village 2  Village 3  Total 
Number of natural villages  9  5  4  18 
Distance to county seat (km)  10  8  2.5  6.8 
Number of households  257  151  393  801 
Total population  1089  535  1449  3073 
Share of minority households (%)  76.6  12.6  6.7  30.8 
Share of household members aged 60 and above (%)  14.2  17.9  12.5  14.1 
Share of households with migrants (%)  30.7  55  43.3  41.4 
Share of household members who migrate (%)  12.3  13.5  12  12.4 
Male head of household (%)  93.5  94.8  91.6  92.8 
Education of household head (years)  2.87  3.06  3.98  4.44 
Household average year of schooling  2.19  2.67  3.67  2.97 
Per capita cultivated land (mu)  0.87  0.86  1.1  0.98 
Percentage of flat land (%)  40  20.7  80  53.4 
Land rental rate (Yuan per mu)  30  50  100  60 
Share of households with TV (%)  39.3  39.7  61.6  50.3 
Share of households with bicycles or motorcycles (%)  2.3  3.3  19.3  10.9 
Share of households with phones (%)  8.9  15.2  23.4  17.2 
Having difficulty with access to drinking water  79.4  80.1  39.2  59.9 
Share of households with local non-farm jobs (%)  49.5  43.7  66.5  56.6 
Share of households with self-employment (%)  7.4  3.3  7.4  6.6 
Share of households with blood donations (%)  40.9  29.1  19.6  28.2 
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Table 2 Poverty and Income Inequality by Three Administrative Villages (2004-2009) 
  Admin Village 1  Admin Village 2  Admin Village 3  Total 
    2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009 
Per capita annual income (RMB)  1009  1111  1262  1274  1638  1655  1749  2420  2442  1404  1817  1907 
Income inequality (Gini)  42.4  45.3  46.5  42.3  52.0  61.8  40.2  42.8  50.9  43.1  48.2  55.2 
Income inequality excluding blood donation (Gini)  46.6  46.9  47.4  44.7  52.5  63.5  42.4  43  51.4  46.3  49  56.6 
Income below low poverty line of 668 RMB (%)    (P0)  37.6  37.9  20.5  30.1  32.4  23.5  13.2  12.6  9.1  24.8  25.1  15.3 
poverty-gap below low poverty line (P1)  14.2  15.4  8.8  9.2  11  11.6  4.4  4.3  4.5  8.7  9.4  7.1 
squared poverty-gap below low poverty line (P2)  7.2  8.9  5.4  3.7  5.5  7.9  2  2  3.3  4.1  5.1  4.7 
Income below high poverty line of 892 RMB (%)    (P0)  54.1  52.5  30.7  41.1  44.1  33.3  23.4  21.1  13.1  37.3  36.3  22.4 
poverty-gap below high poverty line (P1)  22.4  23.3  13  15.8  17.9  16.1  8.1  7.5  6.1  14.5  15  10.1 
squared poverty-gap below high poverty line (P2)  12.2  13.6  7.8  7.7  9.6  10.5  3.9  3.7  4.2  7.5  8.3  6.4 
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Table 3 Income and Consumption by Three Administrative Villages (2004-2009) 
   Admin Village 1  Admin Village 2  Admin  Village 3  Total 
   2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009 
Main Sources of Income (Percent)                         
  Farming  26.3  26.7  23.7  31.0  37.4  29.5  37.0  31.5  26.1  33.3  31.4  33.1 
  Livestock  12.3  13.3  13.1  9.1  10.9  10.8  6.0  3.4  2.1  8.1  6.8  6.9 
  Local non-farm and self-employment   18.2  13.8  13.1  6.4  16.7  13.9  32.3  39.9  35.0  24.0  30.0  23.8 
  Remittance from migrants outside the county  7.8  22.4  11.6  10.9  10.2  9.4  7.3  10.7  6.6  8.0  13.1  8.8 
  Disaster relief, anti-poverty programs, deforestation subsidies  5.1  2.9  6.1  2.5  6.9  5.8  1.9  0.5  4.8  2.8  2.0  5.4 
  Gift income  3.2  4.5  4.7  11.7  11.6  8.4  4.9  11.1  10.7  5.6  9.1  8.2 
  Blood donation income  13  4.6  7.2  15.7  1.7  4.7  7.6  0.7  1.6  10.9  2.2  4.1 
                         
Main Expenditures (Percent) 
                       
  Food  53.8  51.1  48.1  47.1  42.9  36.5  45.4  38.5  34.3  47.8  42.2  35.5 
  Clothing  4.4  4.4  4.6  3.1  3.7  4.1  4.0  4.9  4.1  4.0  4.6  4.2 
  Fuel  5.9  6.4  6.7  5.4  6.9  7.3  10.2  9.5  8.0  8.4  8.3  7.5 
  Telephone  1.1  2.1  5.3  1.3  2.4  3.8  1.5  3.5  6.4  1.4  3.0  5.5 
  Medical care  14.1  16.7  15.1  24.7  16.8  16.9  15.2  15.2  11.2  16.4  15.8  13.5 
  Education  9.0  10.0  9.6  7.9  12.2  14.0  8.8  12.3  14.1  8.7  11.7  12.9 
  Gift and festival spending  6.4  9.2  10.1  6.8  13.9  16.1  8.9  15.9  17.5  7.9  13.9  15.2 
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Table 4 Number of Household Members Donating Blood by Three Villages (2009) 
Admin Village  No Blood Donor  One Blood Donor  Two Blood Donors  Total # Households 
1  257  23  22  302 
2  134  10  3  147 
3  405  17  1  423 
Total # Households  796  50  26  872 






      Table 5 Gift Expenditure and Blood Donation Compensation by Three Villages (2004-2009)   
    Admin Village 1  Admin Village 2  Admin Village 3  Total 
  2004  2006  2009  2004  2006 2009  2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009 
Participation rate in donating blood (%)  40.9  12.8  18.1  29.1  5.7  9.3  19.5  3.8  4.6  28.2  7.2  8.7 
Mean per capita blood donation  (RMB)  197  56.6  178.0  235.5  22.4  93.7  113.4  11  33.0  163.2  28.6  93.8 
Cash compensation (nutrition subsidy) for blood donation (per 500cc)  80  80  150  80  80  150  80  80  150  80  80  150 
                         
Participation rate in gift giving (%)  59.1  85.1  95.0  57  91.8  94.8  66.7  95.4  97.0  62.4  91.2  96.0 
Median per capita gift expenditure (RMB)  16  62.5  125  20  150  200  80  250  571.4  33.3  150  300 
Median gift to direct relatives (RMB per occasion)  30  50    30  50    50  100    40  60   
Median gift to friends/neighbors (RMB per occasion)  10  20  40  15  30  50  25  50  80  20  30  50 
Times of Sending out gifts  -  13.6  11.0  -  8.4  13.8  -  11.1  23.1  -  11.4  17.6 
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Table 6 Median Marriage and funeral Expenditures (RMB) (1996-2009) 
Year  Wedding: Groom's Family  Wedding: Bride's Family  Funeral 
    Brideprice  Gift to bride  Ceremony  Total Expenditure  Dowry  Ceremony  Total Expenditure  Total Expenditure 
1996  2500  2000  2000  6500  0  1000  1000  1750 
1997  3000  1800  2000  6800  1000  0  1000  3000 
1998  3500  2000  2250  7750  1100  500  1600  3000 
1999  2000  1800  2000  5800  300  0  300  3200 
2000  3000  2000  2500  7500  2000  150  2150  3000 
2001  3000  3000  3000  9000  2000  0  2000  3000 
2002  4800  4250  2400  11450  400  0  400  2850 
2003  3000  3500  3000  9500  1900  500  2400  3850 
2004  8000  2500  3500  14000  -**  -**  -**  6000 
2005  9500  5250  3700  18450  2000  0  2000  5000 
2006  8800  5600  3750  18150  2250  3500  5750  5000 
2007  1000  10750  5500  17250  2000  4000  6000  7100 
2008  1000  12000  6500  19500  2000  4000  6000  9180 
2009  1000  12000  6200  19200  1600  4000  5600  7400 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
* Using Recall data from the 2007 survey and 2009 survey. 
** No wedding was held for that category during that year.  
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Table 7 Effect of Social Interactions and Relative Income on Blood Donation 














Median blood Donation 
Participation Rate 
1.238***  1.174***  1.148***  1.391***  4.452***  4.198*** 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Per capita income  -0.197***  0.217  -0.072  -0.147*  -0.007**  -0.02*** 
(0.00)  (0.28)  (0.51)  (0.08)  (0.87)  (0.00) 
Squared 
Per capita income 
0. 003  -0.014  0.001  0.002  0.000  0.000 
(0.20)  (0.33)  (0.67)  (0.42)  (0.94)  (0.72) 
minority  -0.941***  -0.982***  -0.990***  -1.052***  -0.158  -0.202 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.42)  (0.19) 
Share of the 
elderly 
-1.272***  -1.351***  -1.286***  -1.300***  -0.376**  -0.395** 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.02)  (0.01) 
wage Blood  
compensation Ratio 
1.158*  0.758  0.793  1.014  0.553***  0.573*** 
(0.06)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Gini   -1.165 
     
-2.653***  -2.609*** 
(0.40) 
     
(0.00)  (0.00) 
Gini*rank  0.004* 
     
0.004***  0.005*** 
  (0.06) 
     








        Wildman RD 
   
0.001** 
     
 
   
(0.02) 
      rank 
     
0.003*** 
   
 
     
(0.01) 
    year=2006  -2.174***  -2.052***  -1.950***  -2.079***  -0.319  -0.39 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.35)  (0.14) 
Year=2009  -1.586***  -1.274***  -1.127***  -1.335***  0.15  0.063 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.67)  (0.81) 
Observations  2448  2448  2448  2448  2448  2448 
1. p values in parentheses 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Blood donation compensation is excluded from measures of income, 
inequality, and relative deprivation. In column V and VI median rate 
of blood donation in the reference group is suspected to be 
endogenous and instrumented by travel time to the local hospital and 
average income for the prior period in the reference group. 
4. Administrative village fixed effects, shocks (family member death, 
natural disaster, livestock death and big disease), household head 
characteristics (education, gender, marriage status, age, cadre and 
party membership), household characteristics (household size and 
travel time to the local blood bank) are included but not reported 
here. 
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Table 8 Effect of Network-based Identification of Social Interactions on Blood 














Centrality Measure 1  0.008* 
         
 
(0.05) 
          Centrality Measure 2 
 
0.015*** 
       
   
(0.00) 
        Centrality Measure 3 
   
0.007* 
     
     
(0.07) 
      Centrality Measure 4 
     
0.000** 
   
       
(0.01) 
    Centrality Measure 5 
       
0.000*** 
 
         
(0.01) 
  Centrality Measure 6 
         
0.000* 
           
(0.06) 
Per capita income  -0.172  -0.124  -0.186  -0.163  -0.152  -0.197 
(0.22)  (0.39)  (0.19)  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.16) 
Squared 
Per capita income 
0.005  0.004  0.006  0.004  0.005  0.006 
(0.24)  (0.35)  (0.22)  (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.21) 
Share of the elderly  -1.722*  -1.702*  -1.731*  -1.648*  -1.721*  -1.676* 
 
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Gini  1.814  1.6643  1.576  2.880  3.891  0.612 
 
(0.59)  (0.46)  (0.67)  (0.40)  (0.35)  (0.88) 
Gini*rank  -0.000  0. 003  -0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.001 
 
(0.97)  (0.58)  (0.88)  (0.99)  (0.79)  (0.78) 
wage Blood  
compensation Ratio 
1.134  1.652  1.059  1.188  1.551  1.171 
(0.44)  (0.28)  (0.47)  (0.41)  (0.30)  (0.42) 
year=2006  -2.451**  -3.096***  -2.409**  -2.519***  -2.977***  -2.449** 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Year=2009  -0.834*  -1.361***  -0.773  -1.190**  -1.585***  -0.866* 
  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.07) 
Observations  618  618  618  618  618  618 
1. p values in parentheses 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Blood donation compensation is excluded from measures of income, 
inequality, and relative deprivation. 
4. Definitions for the centrality measures can are on page 20.  
5. Administrative village fixed effects, shocks (family member death, 
natural disaster, livestock death and big disease), household head 
characteristics (education, gender, marriage status, age, cadre and 
party membership), household characteristics (household size and 
travel time to the local blood bank) are included but not reported 
here. 
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0.013***  0.013***  0.015*** 
               
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
               
 
Centrality 
Measure 1       
0.007*  0.007*  0.007* 
         
 
     
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
         
 
Centrality 
Measure 5             
0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
   
 
           
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
   
 
Centrality 
Measure 4                   
0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
                 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Per capita 
income 
0.378  -0.093  -0.034  0.339  -0.066  -0.076  0.371  -0.112  -0.053  0.362  -0.103  -0.052 




-0.009  0.001  0.003  -0.008  0.002  0.004  -0.009  0.001  0.004  -0.009  0.001  0.004 
(0.57)  (0.75)  (0.50)  (0.61)  (0.67)  (0.37)  (0.58)  (0.78)  (0.43)  (0.56)  (0.79)  (0.46) 
Deaton RD  3.459*** 
   
3.252*** 
   
3.42*** 




  (0.00) 
   
(0.00) 
   
(0.00) 







   
0.001* 
   
0.001* 
   




   
(0.07) 
   
(0.07) 
   
(0.09)   
rank 
   
0.003* 
   
0.002 
   
0.003 
   
0.003 
     
(0.10) 
   
(0.35) 
   
(0.23) 
   
(0.26) 
Observations  618  618  618  618  618  618  618  618  618  618  618  618 
1. p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
2. Definitions for the centrality measures can are on page 20. 
3. Administrative village and year fixed effects, shocks (family member death, natural disaster, 
livestock death and big disease), natural village mean income, household head characteristics (education, 
gender, marriage status, age, cadre and party membership), household characteristics (household size, 
share of the elderly, and travel time to the local blood bank), and wage blood price ratio are included 
but not reported here.  - 39 - 
Table 10 Effect of Network-based Social Interactions and Relative Income on Share 
of Family Members Donating Blood (2004-2009) 
 
I  II  III  IV  V 
 
Sub-sample  Full Sample 
Centrality Measure 7  0.000**  0.000** 
     
 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
     
Mean number of family  
Members donating blood  
 
 
1.647*** 1.747*** 1.805*** 
   
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Per capita income  0.012*** 0.015***  -0.024  0.016  0.017 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.22)  (0.60)  (0.51) 
Squared 
Per capita income 
-0.000** -0.000***  0.001  0.000  0.000 





    (0.15) 
 
(0.82) 
   
Gini 
-0.221**    0.738* 
    (0.03) 
 
(0.06) 
   










Wildman RD         
0.000** 
       
(0.05) 
wage Blood  
compensation Ratio 
0.021  0.018  -0.145  -0.205  -0.223 
(0.49)  (0.56)  (0.42)  (0.24)  (0.20) 
Observations  618  618  2448  2448  2448 
1. p values in parentheses 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Blood donation compensation is excluded from measures of income, 
inequality, and relative deprivation. In column III, IV and V mean 
number of blood donors in the reference group is endogenous and 
instrumented by travel time to the local hospital. 
4. Definitions for the centrality measures can are on page 20. 
5. Administrative village and year fixed effects, shocks (family 
member death, natural disaster, livestock death, and big disease), 
household head characteristics (education, gender, marriage status, 
age, cadre and party membership), household characteristics (share 
of the elderly and travel time to the local blood bank) are included 
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Appendix I: Data Descriptions (2004-2006) 
I Village and Household Summary Statistics 
Table 1 and Table 2 present summary statistics for the three administrative villages. 
In Table 1, the longer distance to county seat renders administrative village 1 
significantly fewer marketing opportunities. The proportion of households with migrants 
rose from 31% to 50%. In contrast, migration fell sharply in village 2 as new on-farm 
opportunities developed with the new road. Village 3 had a smaller share of households 
with migrants, because of its easy access to off-farm work in the nearby county seat and 
much more flat land good for farming.
21
Table 2 provides the FGT measures which show that head-count index, poverty gap, 
and squared poverty gap under both the high poverty line and the low poverty line were 
uniformly larger for village 1 and village 2. Compared to village 1 and 2, village 3 had 
much higher per capita income and income growth, higher percentage of flat land, higher 
land rental rate, higher values of home appliances, and easier access to drinking water. 
 Meanwhile, the share of minority households in 
village 1 was overwhelmingly higher than in the other two. Family members in village 1 
also reported significantly fewer average school years. 
Income and expenditure inequality in village 2 were the highest. Inequality 
decomposition tells us that farming and local non-farm jobs (part-time job and wage job) 
were the largest income inequality contributors, while food and medical care were the 
largest expenditure inequality contributors. However, farming and food contribute much 
less to inequality than to their income shares. Remittance was a large contributor to 
income inequality compared to its income share. Blood donation was poverty reducing as 
well as inequality alleviating. Gift income was relatively inequality reducing, but gift and 
festival spending is inequality increasing. 
II Pervasive Blood Donation 
Table 3 shows that in 2004 41%, 29%, and 20% of households in three 
administrative villages donated blood respectively, which accounted for 9% of annual 
                                                 
21 Over 60% of the households in village 3 had members employed off-farm, whereas less than half of the 
households in the other villages did. Meanwhile, 40%, 20%, and 80% of the land in village 1, 2, and 3 are 
flat respectively.   - 41 - 
income to the mean households.
22 Annual per capita blood donation volume was 1000cc. 
Among the three villages, village 2 ranked the first in per capita blood donation, while 
village 1 and village 3 ranked the second and the third respectively.
23
Poverty simulation excluding blood donation income shows large percentage 
increases in FGT measures. The percentage changes are higher for village 1 and village 3 
(Table 4). Figure 1 illustrates poverty situation in the three villages before and after 
deducting blood donation compensation. Besides, excluding the compensation, the Gini 
coefficient is higher for the three villages in both years, which indicates that blood 
donation mitigates unequal distribution. Inequality decomposition verifies that blood 
donation reduces income inequality, since it accounts for 10.9% of total income but 
contributes only 1.8% to total inequality. 
 In general, in all 
three villages poorer households correspond to higher income ratio of blood donation 
(Figure 4). 
Blood donation reflects households’ decisions, meaning that if any of the family 
members is able to donate blood, the household might turn out to be a blood provider. It 
is consistent with the fact that in the local blood bank households with people seriously 
disabled donate blood (CHAIN, 2006). T-test shows that if all family members are 
seriously disabled, the household is less likely to donate blood. Most of these families 
live on government poverty subsidies. 
Cash shortage is almost always an important reason behind blood donation, 
especially when peasants are in their sowing season or faced with shocks. Meanwhile, in 
some rural areas that are endowed with less land, local residents rely on donating blood to 
survive winters when food is scarce. T-test shows that the relationships between per 
capita farmland and blood donation and its value are negative, and the latter link is 
stronger. 
Further, given that off-farm work opportunities are limited and people do not realize 
the long term impact of blood donation towards health outcomes, their initial decision 
                                                 
22 Our natural village level survey (Table 4) shows that in 2004 23% of the households had blood donation 
experience, smaller than 28% in the household survey. However, village level survey shows that in 11% of 
the households sold blood in 2006, while in the household survey it corresponds to 7%. On average, in 
2004 12 households in each natural village treated blood donation as a stable income source, which reduced 
to 6.4 in 2006. 
23 In 2006, village 1 had the highest mean per capita blood donation.   - 42 - 
may end up with lacking of energy to do farm work and relying on blood donation in the 
long run. T-test shows that blood donation corresponds to low farm income. 
An interesting question would be whether a minority-headed household 
systematically differs from a Han family in blood donation. Brown et al. (2008) find that 
minority people are significantly less likely to participate in social status competition, and 
it is interesting to test whether being a minority is less likely to donate blood. 
Another thought provoking question is whether cadres and party members are less 
likely to donate blood, since their special political and social power should avoid them 
from this behavior. However, T-test shows that they are significantly more likely to 
donate blood at larger value. The trend reversed in 2006 when blood contamination 
occurred. Overall, it may suggest that there exists pride effect and they can rationalize 
their behavior. 
III Inflating Social Spending 
Between 2004 and 2006, gift income as a share of total income rose by 41% in 
village 1, and rose by an amazing 127% in village 3. In the three villages, the share of gift 
expenditure and festival spending increased nearly 80% from 7% to 12%. Gift spending 
had higher growth than income growth between 2004 and 2006. Village 3 had the largest 
share of per capita gift expenditure and median per capita gift expenditure. 
Table 3 provides information on gift expenditures in different social occasions, but it 
excludes other non-gift expenditures, such as holding weddings, funerals, child births 
ceremonies, college entrance ceremonies, big diseases, natural disasters, and livestock 
deaths. Non-gift social expenditures mainly occur in weddings and funerals (Table 5 and 
Table 6). From 2004 to 2006, the gift giving participation rate on average increased by 
50%, while median per capita gift expenditure increased by nearly 4 times on average. 
Median gift per occasion given to direct relatives is much more than given to friends and 
neighbors, with a roughly equal increasing rate of 50%. On average, in 2006 people sent 
out gift twice. Comparing median gift for husbands’ and wives’ family between 2001 and 
2006, the male/female ratio of median gift expenditure per occasion converged, while in 
absolute value median gift per occasion for male side is still much higher than median 
gift for female side.   - 43 - 
In the 2007 survey, we collected household book record for social spending in the 
last ten years.
24
Research solely based on gift-giving might underestimate the negative positional 
externality, as other social spending also takes major effects. In China, gift expenditure 
accounts for a small part of total social spending, compared to holding social occasions 
such as wedding and funeral, which call for much larger amount of cash expenditure. 
 Gift expenditure and income in different social occasions were also 
collected. From gift receivers’ records, we list in Table 5 gift income from marriages in 
grooms’ family and marriages in brides’ family. We also provide gift value in funerals of 
family member death during that period. Although weddings and funerals are not 
frequent in the three villages, it is clear that gift expenditure per occasion during major 
social events has soared lately. 
The groom’s family is responsible for paying a bride price, which is often 
accompanied by gifts to the bride and huge expenditure holding the wedding ceremony. 
Meanwhile, the bride’s parents usually send out dowry with the bride to gain more equal 
status in the new family. Table 6 illustrates that median wedding expenditure in the last 
ten years has had a year-on-year increase of 17% in the three villages, far exceeding the 
growth rate and absolute value of per capita income. The bride’s family has endured less 
prominent but significant increase. 
Funerals usually provide another opportunity for status competition both for the 
decedent’s family and its relatives and friends. Funerals typically last several days, which 
involve all kinds of things from simple meals to fancy banquets. Table 6 shows a steadily 
large amount of spending and rapidly increasing trend. 
If we further consider the massive house building campaign before marriage, the 
burden of social spending is even more overloaded. Traditionally, the groom’s family is 
responsible for building a house (“Xi Fang”) for the new couple, which renders an 
expense far exceeding even the total cost of wedding ceremony. In the three villages, it is 
easily seen that a lot of Xi Fang are empty because the new couples migrate out to work. 
Nonetheless, the house is built to show social status of parents from both sides. 
 
                                                 
24 For social spending, most of rural households keep detailed record of involved names, expenditures, and 
gift sent out or received to keep track of network around them. Thus, the recall error rate is very low, even 
over a long period.   - 44 - 
Appendix II Measures of Centrality 
To begin exploring how social interactions, embodied in social structure and social 
power, influence blood donation decision, a series of comprehensive measures of 
structure and power are summarize below. The centrality of a node in a network captures 
the idea of power and prominence in a certain social structure (Freeman, 1979). Three 
measures are most frequently used, degree centrality, closeness centrality and Bonacich 
centrality. 
The normalized degree centrality of a node i in network g is defined as the degree of 












. Higher degree 
centrality corresponds to more ties, more dominance of the resources in the network, and 
hence lower dependence on other individuals. Degree centrality for the entire network g 
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* i  is the node that achieves the highest degree centrality in network g.  
Closeness centrality is calculated based on proximity. The normalized closeness 
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ji dijg
≠ ∑  denotes 
the total distance from node i to all other nodes in network g. The higher the total 
distance, the lower closeness centrality it would be. It is further multiplied by the 
minimum possible total distance( 1) n− . Closeness centrality for the entire network g is 
defined relative to the maximum attainable differences between closeness centrality for 
node 
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* i  is the node that achieves the highest closeness centrality in network g. 
The degree centrality and closeness centrality are equal for two extreme cases, star 
network and cycle network, while they are valued differently in this range. The major 
shortcoming for the two centrality measures is that it excludes the case when actions of a   - 45 - 
person influence actions of their neighbors which in turn feedback on the initiator. The 
degree centrality only takes into account the immediate ties each node has. One node 
might be centrally tied to a large number of others, but those others might be 
disconnected from the network as a whole. The closeness centrality solely depends on the 
length of the shortest paths between nodes in network, while it is possible that ties are not 
perfectly reliable and other paths of different lengths may take effects. Fortunately, both 
the direct and indirect influences in a network are captured by Bonacich centrality. 
Bonacich centrality is mainly based on the adjacency matrix G  of network g, in 
which an entry in a square corresponding to a pair {i, j} denotes whether there exists a 
link from i to j. In adjacency matrix G , entries in the main diagonal is set to be 0. 
k G denotes the k-th power of the matrix, where 
0 GI = . In 
k G , an entry 
k
ij g  measures the 
amount of walks of length k that exist between players i and j in network g.  
A matrix  (, ) Mg ασ  is well-defined when ασ  is sufficiently small. Its entry 
0 (, ) ( )
kk
ij ij k mg g ασ ασ
∞
= =∑  measures the total amount of walks in g from i to j where 
walks of length k are weighted by ()
k ασ .  
1
0
( , ) [1 ] ( )
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Given parameterασ
25 1 ( , ) [1 ] b Cg G J ασ ασ
− = − , Bonacich centrality vector is defined as , 
where Bonacich centrality of node i 
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=∑ . It is straightforward to 
observe that Bonacich centrality is no smaller than 1. 
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25 In our empirical study, Bonacich centrality with positive attenuation factors generated by the UCINET 
software are adopted, as we accept the idea that being connected to neighbors with more connections makes 
one powerful. However, in some sociology literature negative attenuation factors are used since they argue 
that neighbors without many connections to others make ego more powerful. The two results differ, 
especially for households whose ties are mostly with households of high degree.   - 46 - 
Appendix III-1 Effect of Social Interactions and Relative Income on Values of Blood 














Median per capita 
blood donation 
0.774***  0.644**  0.650**  0.745***  2.887***  3.084*** 
(0.00)   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Per capita income  1.098  4.608  -2.887  2.180  -105.939***  -106.029*** 
(0.82)  (0.46)  (0.69)  (0.68)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
squared 
per capita income 
-0.005  -0.100  0 .067  -0.048  1.931*  1.933* 
(0.97)  (0.54)  (0.68)  (0.74)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
minority  -78.975***  -84.414***  -84.160***  -87.385***  -259.631*  -238.270* 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Share of the 
elderly 
-89.273***  -95.101***  -92.924***  -94.038***  -535.801***  -535.086*** 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Wage/blood 
compensation 
63.679  18.676  21.982  25.196  9.131  -15.644 
(0.14)  (0.69)  (0.63)  (0.58)  (0.98)  (0.96) 
Gini  -403.766*** 
     
1,377.256**  1,614.494** 
  (0.00) 
     
(0.04)  (0.02) 
Gini*rank  0.344** 
     
0.775  0.783 
  (0.04) 
     








        Wildman RD 
   
0.011 
     
 
   
(0.48) 
      rank 
     
0.150** 
   
       
(0.03) 
    Year=2006  -119.424***  -104.227***  -106.238***  -106.425***  -550.880**  -521.001** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Year=2009  -23.914  -12.174  -12.619  -12.828  -673.422***  -658.355*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.67)  (0.66)  (0.65)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Observations  2448  2448  2448  2448  2448  2448 
1. p values in parentheses 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Blood donation compensation is excluded from measures of income, 
inequality, and relative deprivation. In column V and VI median 
value of blood donation in the reference group is suspected to be 
endogenous and instrumented by travel time to the local hospital and 
average income for the prior period in the reference group. 
4. Administrative village fixed effects, shocks (family member death, 
natural disaster, livestock death and big disease), household head 
characteristics (education, gender, marriage status, age, cadre and 
party membership), household characteristics (household size and 
travel time to the local blood bank) are included but not reported 
here. 
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Appendix III-2 Effect of Network-based Social Interactions and Relative Income on 
Values of Blood Donation (Sub-sample, 2004-2009) 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Centrality 
Measure 2 
1.950***  1.838*** 
     
 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
     
 
Centrality 
Measure 4     
0.003***  0.003*** 
 
 
   




Measure 5         
0.003***  0.003*** 
       
(0.00)  (0.00) 
Per capita 
income 
12.028  20.323  7.381  22.592*  11.971  23.813* 




-0.229  -0.441  -0.184  -0.519  -0.257  0.534 
(0.46)  (0.25)  (0.55)  (0.18)  (0.39)  (0.15) 










(0.57)   


























135.759  70.779  88.151  -4.152  82.883  51.189 
(0.16)  (0.49)  (0.37)  (0.97)  (0.38)  (0.61) 
Share of 
The elderly 
-174.229***  -171.615***  -174.624***  -171.357***  -179.065***  -179.141*** 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
year=2006  -165.631**  -124.293*  -106.754  -48.386  -156.428**  -135.757** 
 
(0.01)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.49)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
year=2009  -6.596  71.169  23.431  134.757**  -47.753  -5.665 
 
(0.84)  (0.22)  (0.46)  (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.92) 
Observations  618  618  618  618  618  618 
1. p values in parentheses 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Blood donation compensation is excluded from measures of income, 
inequality, and relative deprivation. 
4. Definitions for the centrality measures can are on page 20. 
5. Administrative village fixed effects, shocks (family member death, 
natural disaster, livestock death and big disease), household head 
characteristics (education, gender, marriage status, age, cadre and 
party membership), household characteristics (household size and 
travel time to the local blood bank), and wage blood price ratio are 
included but not reported here. 
 
 
 
 
 